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I. INTRODUCTION
―Peru is like a double A battery: it lives permanently polarized,‖ a local
journalist recently wrote in a Lima-based magazine.1 He wrote his
observation nearly a decade after the conclusion of Peru‘s twenty-year
internal armed conflict that began in 1980 in which state agents contributed to
systematic and generalized human rights violations while fighting to defeat
national subversive groups. During this conflict, print and broadcast media
parted from objectivity as it became obligated to take a stand on government
actions, choosing to either defend them or, alternatively, resist and face
backlash. When Alberto Fujimori came to power in 1990, his authoritarian
approach to national security included manipulation of the media intended to
compel the public to support his repressive regime. 2 Fujimori eventually fled
the country in 2000 due to corruption scandals, 3 at which time a transitional
government established the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission
(PTRC) and initiated criminal trials to prosecute human rights abusers.4 Yet,
even after issuance of the PTRC‘s nine-volume report in 2003 and the
conviction of key perpetrators,5 including Fujimori, Peru still suffers intense
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1. José Villaorduña, Un chifa a que es culpable, DEDOMEDIO (Peru), Apr. 2009, at 18, 19
(authors‘ trans.).
2. See infra Part III.A.
3. See Lisa J. Laplante, Outlawing Amnesty: The Return of Criminal Justice in Transitional
Justice Schemes, 49 VA. J. INT‘L L. 915, 919 (2009).
4. Lisa J. Laplante, On the Indivisibility of Rights: Truth Commissions, Reparations, and the
Right to Development, 10 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 141, 143 (2007).
5. PERUVIAN TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMM‘N, TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION
COMMISSION FINAL REPORT (2003), http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/index.php [hereinafter PTRC].
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polarization on issues regarding its past conflict.6 Notably, mass media plays
a direct role in this ongoing societal tension.
Indeed, for many post-conflict countries like Peru, the end of gunfire does
not necessarily imply an end to internal conflict. Remaining post-conflict
societal friction may even be as threatening to long-lasting peace as the war
itself. This situation may be attributed, in part, to the media‘s failure to
adequately mediate conflicting views of a country‘s history—its causes and
consequences, its villains and heroes. Certainly, newspapers, radio, and
television, as well as the newly emerging micromedia (e.g., email) and middle
media (e.g., web logs or ―blogs‖),7 reach huge audiences on a daily basis
before, during, or after conflict. As primary information sources in a
democracy, these news outlets affect not only society‘s impression of what
news and issues should receive attention, but also the perception of this
information. Given the great role that the media plays in shaping public
opinion, it merits careful discussion.
Certainly, the process of how a country transitions toward a peaceful
democracy after episodes of political violence has earned significant and
increasing attention and has even become its own field of study—transitional
justice. Up until now, the theory of transitional justice has offered a standard
formula consisting of a combination of restorative and retributive justice
through truth commissions, trials of human rights violators, and reform of
political and legal institutions.8 These measures aim to foster reconciliation—
a form of ongoing conflict resolution and management—among not only
opposing sides to the conflict, but also the citizens caught in their crossfire.
Despite the plethora of academic and scholarly literature in the transitional
justice field, the role and influence that the media has in these processes
remain largely unexplored. In response, this Article examines the weight of
the media‘s impact on both societies in conflict and societies in post-conflict
transition settings, including coverage of truth commission work and criminal
trials. It explores the case of Peru to show how media coverage of transitional
justice processes, and the dialogue that ensues, can promote or hinder national
6. See infra Part III.D.
7. W. Lance Bennett has used the term ―micromedia‖ to describe e-mail and the term ―middle
media‖ to describe blogs. W. LANCE BENNETT, NEWS: THE POLITICS OF ILLUSION 8 (7th ed. 2007).
8. See Laplante, supra note 3, at 921 (stating that definitions of transitional justice vary, but
that trials serve an important purpose in the field of transitional justice); Laplante, supra note 4, at
145 (quoting Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 69, 79 (2003)
(―[T]ransitional justice [is] ‗the conception of justice associated with periods of political change,
characterized by legal responses to confront the wrongdoings of repressive predecessor regimes.‘‖));
Lisa J. Laplante & Kimberly Theidon, Transitional Justice in Times of Conflict: Colombia’s Ley de
Justicia y Paz, 28 MICH. J. INT‘L L. 49, 50 (2006) (―By definition, transitional justice involves
alternative approaches to conventional justice, thus provoking lively and at times contentious
debate.‖).
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reconciliation in post-conflict settings.
The Article contends that if
reconciliation lays the foundation for preventing new cycles of violence, then
transitional justice theory must begin considering how to attend to the media
so that it exerts a positive influence on post-conflict recovery. To initiate this
new direction in the field, the Article examines the media through two
important lenses: first, the way in which the media disseminates information
about transitional justice mechanisms such as truth commissions and trials,
and the impact that this reporting has on increasing or decreasing local
tensions; and second, how media institutions play a role in conflict and thus
must be held accountable and subject to reform in transitional justice settings
to ensure sustainable and peaceful democracies.
Part II discusses transitional justice theory as it applies to post-conflict
societies, paying particular attention to its overarching goal of reconciliation
and long-term conflict resolution. Part III explores the media‘s impact in
conflict settings, using Peru as a case study, and suggests that conflict
situations impact media institutions and that media institutions thus should
become subject to reform. Finally, Part IV identifies some of the ways in
which systematic support or reform of the media may be approached based on
the particular challenges facing post-conflict transitions.
II. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE THEORY AND ITS LIMITED DEBATE ON THE
MEDIA
After a society endures an internal armed conflict, repression, or other
deviant political situations, how does it build or restore the rule of law, a
culture of human rights, and democracy? This question has shaped the
evolution of the transitional justice field, which traces back to the Nuremberg
trials in 1945 but gained particular salience during the post-Cold War era
when numerous authoritarian and Communist states began to transition
toward democracy.9 Over the past two decades, transitional justice theory has
expanded and diversified through ongoing analysis and perspective on how to
approach issues such as: How does the state provide redress to victims for the
injustices brought against them? What is the state‘s role in repairing victims
or punishing oppressors? How can citizens reconcile with their government
and fellow citizens after being caught in crossfire? Constrained by difficult
and divisive political realities and pressured by demands for justice and
accountability, states in transition have usually resorted to mechanisms like

9. See, e.g., Laplante, supra note 3, at 920–31 (describing the history of transitional justice);
see generally Roy Palmer Domenico, Italian Fascists on Trial, 1943–1948, in [2 COUNTRY STUDIES]
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: HOW EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES 175, 184
(Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995) (describing trials and investigations taking place in France and Italy during
1944 and 1945).
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truth commissions, reparations, institutional reform, and limited criminal trials
with amnesties.10
Typically, transitional justice projects use these mechanisms for the
express purpose of achieving the overarching goals of reconciliation and
finally sustainable peace.11
Very generally, reconciliation refers to
―developing a mutual conciliatory accommodation between antagonistic or
formerly antagonistic persons or groups,‖12 and is both a process and an end
point. The PTRC viewed reconciliation as forming a new social pact with the
marginalized citizens who suffered the most in the armed conflict; thus, it
recommended the incorporation of inclusive and participatory channels into
the country‘s democratic reforms.13 While the notion of reconciliation
remains one of the least defined and most contested topics in transitional
justice,14 it frequently embodies the idea of nonrepetition and prevention of
new violence.15 This sentiment is reflected in common mottos coined to
accompany transitional justice experiences, such as Peru‘s civil society slogan
―Para que no se repita‖ (―So that it doesn‘t happen again‖), or the name of
Argentinean truth commission report ―Nunca más‖ (―Never again‖).16 In
essence, a post-conflict setting always potentially exists as a pre-conflict
situation without the institution of certain measures to ensure peace. The
notion of national reconciliation thus points toward a thicker definition of
conflict resolution and management in post-conflict settings.
As
communication scholar Eytan Gilboa explains:
The distinction between resolution and reconciliation is based
on the assumption that even if parties to a conflict reach a
10. See Lisa J. Laplante, Transitional Justice and Peace Building: Diagnosing and Addressing
the Socioeconomic Roots of Violence Through a Human Rights Framework, 2 INT‘L J.
TRANSITIONAL JUST. 331, 333 (2008) (―[R]emedies include[] prosecuting perpetrators of human
rights violations, revealing the truth about past crimes, providing victims/survivors with reparations
and reforming governmental institutions.‖); PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS:
CONFRONTING STATE TERROR & ATROCITY 155 (2001).
11. See HAYNER, supra note 10, at 11 (―A state may have a number of objectives in responding
to past abuses: to punish perpetrators, establish the truth, repair or address damages, pay respect to
victims, and prevent further abuses. There may be other aims as well, such as promoting national
reconciliation and reducing conflict over the past . . . .‖).
12. Id. at 155. Reconciliation as a concept is commonly associated with the notion of
forgiveness between victims and perpetrators due to the South African Truth & Reconciliation
Commission‘s heavy emphasis on religious pardons. See id.
13. See Lisa J. Laplante, The Peruvian Truth Commission’s Historical Memory Project:
Empowering Truth-Tellers to Confront Truth Deniers, 6 J. HUM. RTS. 433, 439 (2007).
14. See Jeremy Sarkin & Erin Daly, Too Many Questions, Too Few Answers: Reconciliation in
Transitional Societies, 35 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 661, 665–66 (2004) (stating that the definition
of reconciliation varies by country).
15. See Laplante, supra note 10, at 332.
16. Id.; Para Que No Se Repita, http://www.paraquenoserepita.org.pe/ (last visited Dec. 2,
2009).
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peace agreement, it is only an agreement between leaders, not
between peoples, and that to be effective it must be fully
implemented and respected over time. Successful conflict
resolution ends with a formal peace agreement (negative
peace), while successful reconciliation ends with a positive or
stable peace.17
Building on Gilboa‘s distinction, transitional justice encompasses more
than just the cessation of warfare—it aims to establish and build deeper
institutional and inter-societal reforms toward lasting peace.18 Indeed, it is
often generalized popular dissatisfaction with the performance of state
institutions, combined with the state‘s failure to provide democratic channels
to hear and respond to these complaints, that give rise to social grievances and
cause such protest to become violent.19 Thus, transitional justice promotes
addressing these flint-like issues at their roots, requiring reform and the
population‘s ability to agree on its past. For example, truth commissions seek
to create a collective memory and consensus among a population20 that is
often still divided in the wake of conflict; trials and reparations seek to reveal
wrongdoing and settle accounts so as to quiet vengeful tendencies; and
institutional reform aims to repair legal and political institutions to ensure that
the rule of law and democracy operates properly to resolve conflicts.21
Strikingly absent in transitional justice scholarship, however, is discussion
of the role, as well as possible reform of, media institutions and systems in the
transitional justice processes that play out in post-conflict societies.22 This
gap in the literature comes as no surprise considering that the role of the
media in conflict and post-conflict settings remains a relatively unexplored
area of research across all disciplines, even that of media communications
study.23 However, this lack of study on the role of the media in conflict and
post-conflict societies does not mean the media has a limited impact in these
situations. On the contrary, ―[m]edia can positively influence reconciliation
17. Eytan Gilboa, Media and International Conflict: A Multidisciplinary Approach, 2007 J.
DISP. RESOL. 229, 232.
18. See Laplante, supra note 10, at 332–33.
19. See id. at 337 (―[V]iolence flows from persistent socioeconomic inequalities, coupled with
a lack of effective channels of redress.‖).
20. See Laplante & Theidon, supra note 8, at 91.
21. See HAYNER, supra note 10, at 11 (listing the aims of transitional justice programs).
22. For example, Priscilla Hayner‘s book now stands as a standard text in the field of
transitional justice but mentions media only five times, once to mention possible secondary trauma
suffered by journalists covering the truth commission hearings, id. at 152, and the other times to
mention when the media covered a truth commission closely, id. at 42, 100, 225–26. There is limited
analysis and no suggestion of the need to directly address the institution of media as part of reform
efforts in post-conflict settings. See id. at 42, 100, 152, 225–26.
23. See Gilboa, supra note 17, at 229.
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in the aftermath of violent conflict just as the negative use of the media
magnifies and promotes conflict.‖24 Furthermore, as the Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) recognized, ―building a free and
independent media is integral to creating an open and civil society as well as
fostering peace and reconciliation.‖25 Yet, given that the media tends to suffer
direct attacks on its independence both during and after conflict,26 the media
faces difficult and unique challenges in the conflict recovery process.
III. THE MEDIA IN TIMES OF CONFLICT
The role of the media in conflict settings may be too often underestimated.
Indeed, the media has great potential to either incite or calm societal tensions.
Consider, for example, how at the same time that some journalists take great
risks to assure full coverage of controversial issues like political violence,
corruption, and human rights violations, other national journalists directly
assist in the commission of these egregious crimes. For example, Rwanda
became a ―textbook example‖ of the media used ―to encourage and sustain
genocidal tendencies.‖27 Specifically, the private broadcast company Libre
des Mille Collines and the national Radio Rwanda took active roles in
fomenting ethnic hatred among citizens, driving the Hutu people to kill at
least a half-million of the Tutsi population in 1994.28 Similarly, the media
played a central role in fueling ethnic tensions in the Balkan wars, in which
the Serbian state controlled the media to promote its campaign against
Kosavar Albanians, assuring that journalists who took ―views contrary to the
official perspective . . . were routinely harassed, mostly unread or unheard,
and did little to change public opinion.‖29
The recently concluded civil war in Sri Lanka, where an estimated 70,000
to 80,000 civilians were killed over the course of three decades, offers another
example of how the media plays an integral role in influencing public

24. Ellen Yamshon & Daniel Yamshon, Comics Media in Conflict Resolution Programs: Are
They Effective in Promoting and Sustaining Peace?, 11 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 421, 425 (2006).
25. Monroe E. Price, Restructuring the Media in Post-Conflict Societies: Four Perspectives:
The Experience of Intergovernmental and Non-governmental Organizations, 2 CARDOZO ONLINE J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 1, 31 (2000).
26. See, e.g., infra notes 74–81, 88–97, 125–34 and accompanying text.
27. Price, supra note 25, at 1–2.
28. See Alison Des Forges, Silencing the Voices of Hate in Rwanda, in FORGING PEACE:
INTERVENTION, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE MANAGEMENT OF MEDIA SPACE 236, 236 (Monroe E.
Price & Mark Thompson eds., 2002) [hereinafter FORGING PEACE]; see also Phyllis E. Bernard,
Eliminationist Discourse in a Conflicted Society: Lessons for America from Africa?, 93 MARQ. L.
REV. 173, 191–200 (2009).
29. Price, supra note 25, at 5; see also Lynn M. Malley, Observations from an American
Conflict Resolution Professional in Serbia on the Effects of the Accessibility of International Media,
93 MARQ. L. REV. 241, 247–48 (2009).
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opinion.30 Sri Lanka features three functioning languages: the majority
population speaks Sinhalese, the main minority groups speak Tamil, and the
working language is English.31 The media divides along the same lines.32 In
this way, the war between government forces and the separatist-group
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (the LTTE) managed to extend to the
press.33 The Sinhalese media mainly backed the Sri Lankan military and its
push to destroy the LTTE,34 whereas the Tamil media covered the effects of
the war on the Tamil population, and, in some cases, supported the LTTE.35
The English-language media was divided between the state-owned media
house, which produced mainly pro-government propaganda, and a handful of
independent papers that often self-censored for fear of repression.36 During
the final stages of Sri Lanka‘s civil war, no journalists were actually allowed
into the war zone, resulting in an utter lack of professional firsthand accounts
to explain what exactly was happening. This total blackout meant that few
official sources outside of the government existed.
The Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA), a Sri Lankan think tank,
released a media-monitoring report examining coverage during the final
months of the war, from January through April.37 The CPA found that due to
polarized media coverage, Sri Lankans learned very different things about the
war and thus formed different perceptions depending on the media coverage
available to their ethnicity and language.38 The Tamil media used more
sources and covered war-related civilian death and disasters.39 On the other
hand, the (mostly government-run) English and Sinhalese media relied almost
exclusively on state sources and only included information approved by
authorities,40 who had a different focus from the Tamil media:
30. The authors thank distinguished international journalist Jesse Hardman for sharing this
information about Sri Lanka, where he trained local journalists in 2008.
31. See
Cent.
Intelligence
Agency,
World
Factbook
2008,
Sri
Lanka,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ce.html.
32. See Media React to Sri Lanka ―Victory,‖ BBC News (May 19, 2009),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8056787.stm (listing some of the different language
newspapers and how the newspapers covered the end of the civil war in Sri Lanka).
33. See, e.g., id.
34. See CTR. FOR POL‘Y ALTERNATIVES, KEY TRENDS FROM MEDIA MONITORING: JANUARY
TO APRIL 2009, http://www.cpalanka.org/mediamonitoring2009/wp-content/uploads/2009/06/keytrends-jan-to-apr-2009.pdf.
35. See id.
36. See id. As part of its coverage of Sri Lanka‘s war, the BBC printed excerpts from the
different Sri Lankan media as the war ended. See Media React to Sri Lanka ―Victory,‖ supra note
32.
37. See CTR. FOR POL‘Y ALTERNATIVES, supra note 34.
38. See id.
39. See id. All civilian casualties in the northern war front were Tamil. Id.
40. See id.
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What was mostly revealed through the information provided
by the authorities was either transportation of essential
commodities or the harassments that the civilians [were]
facing under the LTTE. It was only the Tamil media which
reported on the loss of lives[,] injuries, dearth of food and
medicine and many other grievances that the people [were]
suffering, in addition to such information provided. For this
they were depending on the sources such as [web site]
reports, foreign media reports and the statements of local and
international institutions and individuals[,] etc.41
For Sri Lankans to get a more complete picture of what exactly went on
during the last stages of the war, they had to read multiple newspapers and
web sites and then somehow discern what to believe.
Certainly, the role that the media carries out during conflict can have a
major impact on society, greatly influencing the aggravation or the abatement
of opposing sentiments. In fact, due to this immense power the media has
over society‘s perceptions, the manipulation of the media is almost always a
primary tool for repressive political leaders and warlords.42 In these
exceptionally complex settings, journalists often face significant limits on
their abilities to successfully practice their profession. New York Times editor
and Pulitzer Prize winner Tina Rosenberg observes: ―In many countries,
journalists must also contend with laws that make libel a criminal offense, and
use a very broad standard to define libel. Venezuela criminalizes expression
deemed disrespectful to public officials even if completely true.‖43 The
media‘s experience during Peru‘s conflict resembles this pattern and offers an
important look at how both extremes—positive and negative journalism—
play out in both conflict and post-conflict settings.
A. The Media in Peru’s Conflict
Peruvian journalists and the media had important roles from the start of
Peru‘s internal armed conflict, which the self-declared Maoist group Sendero
Luminoso (Shining Path, or SL), led by Abimael Guzmán, ignited when it
took up arms against the state in 1980.44 Capitalizing on the Peruvian poor‘s
41. CTR. FOR POL‘Y ALTERNATIVES, CPA MEDIA MONITORING IN 2009: CHANNEL 4 AND
HUMANITARIAN
REPORTAGE,
June
1,
2009,
http://www.cpalanka.org/
mediamonitoring2009/?p=197#more-197.
42. See Price, supra note 25, at 1; see, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 69–97.
43. Tina Rosenberg, The Long, Hard Road of Investigative Reporting in Latin America, N.Y.
TIMES, July 2, 2006, at 9.
44. See NELSON MANRIQUE GÁLVEZ, EL TIEMPO DEL MIEDO: LA VIOLENCIA POLITICA EN EL
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rising popular dissatisfaction with socioeconomic conditions, SL conducted a
vigorous recruiting campaign in the rural highlands,45 increasing its influence
while spreading fear and terror. With most of the battle occurring far from the
coastal capital of Lima, many Peruvians remained ignorant of the violence‘s
extent and the lives it claimed.46 In fact, ―in part because the war was still a
mystery to many urban Peruvians,‖ eight journalists began a trip on
January 26, 1983, from Lima to Ayacucho, as ―an expedition in search of the
‗truth.‘‖47 They had planned to ―investigate rumors that the ‗Indians‘ had
been killing the Senderistas,‖48 or SL members, by traveling to the village of
Huaychao.49 Yet in the course of their trip, they passed through a town named
Uchuraccay where they were brutally murdered.50 The causes for and events
surrounding the journalists‘ murders are still a subject of heated debate.51
However, the violent case of Uchuraccay succeeded for the first time in
raising national awareness of the rising violence in Peru.52 For many, the case
of Uchuraccay marked the initiation of the conflict in rural Peru because until
then, ―the violence had not captured significant national attention.‖53
Under similarly ambiguous circumstances, 135 inhabitants of Uchuraccay
also were murdered in the months following the journalists‘ deaths, caught
between attacks by SL, repression from state forces, and protection measures
of the local rondas campesinas (rural self-defense committees).54 Yet these
deaths would not be discovered until the investigations of the PTRC nearly
two decades later.55 The PTRC considered the case of Uchuraccay to be ―an
emblematic example of the violence and pain in the country‘s collective
memory.‖56 Just as a ―20-year oblivion‖ blanketed the deaths of the
Uchuraccay inhabitants, the only explanations given for the journalists‘
murders resulted from ―controversial investigations that failed to clarify the
PERÚ 1980–1996, at 14 (2002). The Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) soon followed
as a lesser force in 1983. See Laplante, supra note 3, at 945 n.155.
45. MANRIQUE, supra note 44, at 14.
46. See Kimberly Theidon, Histories of Innocence: Post-War Stories in Peru, in LOCALIZING
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: INTERVENTIONS AND PRIORITIES AFTER MASS VIOLENCE (Rosalind Shaw,
Lars Waldorf & Pierre Hazan eds., forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 8, on file with the authors).
47. Id.
48. Kimberly Theidon, “How We Learned To Kill our Brother”?: Memory, Mortality and
Reconciliation in Peru, 29 BULLETIN DE L‘INSTITUT FRANÇAIS D‘ÉTUDES ANDINES [BULL. INST.
FR. ÉTUDES ANDINES] 539, 543 (2000) (Peru).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 544.
52. See Theidon, supra note 46 (manuscript at 8).
53. Id.
54. 5 PTRC, supra note 5, at 121.
55. Id.
56. Id. (authors‘ trans.).
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reason for their deaths.‖57
As depicted in the case of Uchuraccay, the confusing nature of the
guerrilla-style war, as well as the government‘s failure to understand it, led to
vast human rights violations, including murder, mass graves, extrajudicial
executions, forced disappearances, widespread gender violence, torture, and
many other examples of brutality as much against the combatants as the
innocent bystanders.58 Yet, the fact that the victims were journalists
distinguishes the Uchuraccay case because their untimely deaths resulted from
their protagonist roles in assuring transparency and truth about the conflict.
Though it is true that ―the media take[s] on greater responsibility as the public
reflexively turns to [it] for clarification, and at times even for direction‖59
during times of conflict, it is this very burden that puts journalists‘ lives at
risk. Importantly in the Uchuraccay case, it was the journalists‘ diligent
efforts to provide information on the conflict and their resulting martyrdom
that revealed the conflict‘s severity to those in Lima, including the Peruvian
government.60 In turn, the national press ―actively participated in the dispute
on the facts,‖ giving rise to national awareness on the weight of the expanding
internal armed conflict.61
Despite the pronounced risks, journalists continued to play a critical role
in Peru‘s conflict into the 1990s, when Alberto Fujimori came to power.
Fujimori was elected in 1990 despite his relative political obscurity because
many Peruvians believed he represented the change they so desperately
awaited.62 A stifling economic crisis coupled with the ominous spread of
terrorism63 made the population especially willing to accept harsh measures
that would immediately and visibly improve daily life. In this context,
Fujimori‘s government was easily able to slide toward authoritarianism and
57. Id. (authors‘ trans.).
58. See generally 1 PTRC, supra note 5.
59. Claude Salhani, Media in Conflict: Inciting Violence in Kosovo, 7 GEO. J. INT‘L AFF. 33, 37
(2006).
60. See Theidon, supra note 48 at 543; Theidon, supra note 46 (manuscript at 8).
61. 5 PTRC, supra note 5, at 156 (authors‘ trans.).
62. With his motto of ―[h]onesty, technology and work,‖ and playing on the existing image of
the Japanese as hardworking and decent, Alberto Fujimori seemed to embody this change. See
SALLY BOWEN, EL EXPEDIENTE FUJIMORI: PERÚ Y SU PRESIDENTE 1990–2000, at 13 (Richard
Bauer ed., 2000) (authors‘ trans.). As a political ―outsider‖ and ethnic minority, he particularly
appealed to certain sectors of Peruvian society that had been traditionally marginalized by
mainstream politics. See Steven Levitsky, Fujimori and Post-Party Politics in Peru, J. DEMOCRACY
78, 82 (1999).
63. See Laplante, supra note 3, at 945 (noting that Alan García‘s first term, from 1985 to 1990,
plunged the country into an economic crisis, with inflation rising to 2 million percent). See
MANRIQUE, supra note 44, at 51; Laplante, supra note 3, at 945. In this context, the violence that
prevailed in the rural areas slowly began to seep into the capital. Car bombs and electrical blackouts,
once unfamiliar, soon became commonplace in Lima.
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corruption. Fujimori gained worldwide notoriety when he conducted a
self-coup in April 1992, during which he dismantled the Congress, judiciary,
and Constitutional Congress.64 He used his expanded executive powers to
issue draconian antiterrorism laws and create what was later discovered to be
a military death squad to carry out extrajudicial executions of suspected
terrorists.65 In fact, as early as 1991, Fujimori‘s administration faced national
and international scrutiny when state armed forces were suspected of
conducting two massacres: the Barrios Altos in 1991 (a neighborhood
fundraiser where fifteen people were executed) and La Cantuta in July 1992
(a university where nine students and a professor were kidnapped and
murdered).66
Despite early indications of state involvement in these tragic events, the
government repeatedly changed its official story, first blaming SL, then
blaming alleged rogue state agents. Ultimately, it took investigative
journalism to uncover the truth and put pressure on the state to investigate the
wrongdoing.67 For example, the magazine Sí first provided evidence that the
executors were actually part of a government-led death squad unofficially
known as Colina.68 Some of the media not only maintained the national
spotlight on the government‘s abuses, but also created an ongoing record of
Fujimori‘s regime, which would eventually be used in the trial against him to
prove his role in human rights abuses and corruption.69 Yet, the vigilance of
journalists did not come without challenge and opposition.
Indeed, the commendable contribution of some of Peru‘s journalists must
be understood within the larger scheme of the Fujimori government to use the
media to maintain its stronghold while cultivating a culture of fear. This
technique was the brainchild of Fujimori‘s top advisor and ―spy-chief,‖
Vladimiro Montesinos, who was inspired by Adolf Hitler‘s Mein Kempf and

64. Laplante, supra note 3, at 945.
65. Id. at 946–47. In Fujimori‘s human rights trial, Supreme Court judges determined that this
was part of his counterterrorism strategy. See Sala Penal Especial de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de
la República [CSJR] [Special Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of the Republic], 07/04/2009,
―Luis Antonio León Borja y otros v. Alberto Fujimori Fujimori / asesinato, lesiones y secuestro‖
(Peru), available at http://www.pj.gob.pe/noticias/noticias.asp?codigo=10410&opcion=detalle
[hereinafter Fujimori Human Rights Trial].
66. Laplante, supra note 3, at 947–50.
67. See id. at 950. Due to international and national pressure, Fujimori eventually initiated
trials against members of the Colina death squad. Id. at 951–52. However, after he was reelected in
1995, Fujimori issued amnesty laws, freeing state agents who had been imprisoned for rights abuses
since 1980. Id. at 953–54. With this law, Colina members were pardoned, freeing them of their
conviction for the La Cantuta massacre. Id. at 954.
68. See id. at 950.
69. Fujimori Human Rights Trial, supra note 65, at 77.
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the Nazis‘ use of media control to keep a tight rein over the population.70 For
example, Fujimori and Montesinos used bribes and blackmail, obligating
media outlets to take a favorable position on Fujimiori‘s government.71 The
government even had a military operation—―Plan Bermuda‖—that
specifically persecuted key members of the opposition and journalists.72 Only
a handful of news organizations resisted this pressure throughout Fujimori‘s
regime, most notably Caretas, La República, and El Comercio.73
But the stakes for remaining independent were high. For example, for
refusing a bribe from Montesinos to withhold an article portraying the advisor
as ―Fujimori‘s Rasputin,‖ Enrique Zileri, the director of influential political
magazine Caretas, was taken to court and required to pay a substantial fine.74
Given that Fujimori‘s scheme included bribing judges, the judiciary became a
powerful weapon against those who refused to comply with the invitation to
cooperate.75 Even today, there still exists a marked rivalry between Fujimori
and newspapers like Caretas, which never abandoned its staunch
anti-Fujimori reporting, and, as a consequence, were frequent victims of his
authoritarian controls.76
While a handful of national newspapers managed to maintain some level
of independence, another sector of the local media succumbed to the
government‘s pressures. Specifically, Fujimori capitalized on the existence of
chicha newspapers, a genre of press that arose as a result of the large-scale
migration of Peruvians from the sierra to Lima after the violence in the
1980s.77 Written largely for undereducated populations, chicha newspapers
used a less formal style of writing, published sensationalized or even vulgar
news, and often displayed pictures of scantily dressed women. 78 Recognizing
the mass acceptance of these chicha among lower social sectors, Fujimori and
his supporters bought them with bribes in exchange for the chicha‘s
70. SALLY BOWEN & JANE HOLLIGAN, EL ESPÍA IMPERFECTO: LA TELARAÑA SINIESTRA DE
VLADIMIRO MONTESINOS 42 (2003).
71. See, e.g., John McMillan & Pablo Zoido, How to Subvert Democracy: Montesinos in Peru,
18 J. ECON. PERSP. 69, 79, 81 tbl.4, 82, 84 (2004) (describing the blackmail and bribery that took
place during Fujimori‘s presidency and listing bribes paid to media outlets).
72. BOWEN, supra note 62, at 351.
73. See McMillan & Zoido, supra note 71, at 84; César Arias Quincot, La Infame Década del
Fujimorato, in CÓMO FUJIMORI JODIÓ AL PERÚ 29, 59 (Carlos Milla Batres ed., 2001).
74. BOWEN, supra note 62, at 342–43.
75. See, e.g., McMillan & Zoido, supra note 71, at 77, 80 tbl.3 (describing and listing bribes
paid to members of the judiciary).
76. Id. at 84 (describing how the Fujimori government harassed these newspapers through libel
suits, incarceration, death threats, and by discrediting the independent journalists in articles written in
the media outlets that the Fujimori government had already bribed).
77. See generally JUAN GARGUREVICH, LA PRENSA SENSACIONALISTA EN EL PERÚ 245–94
tbl.6 (2002) (authors‘ trans.).
78. Id. at 13.
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publication of stories that favored Fujimori and attacked his political
opposition, including critical journalists from news outlets that tried to
maintain independence.79 In various cases, this submissiveness to the regime
was actually a ―strategy for survival.‖80 Overburdened with large outstanding
debts, some media outlets found themselves obligated to accept bribes.81
―Smokescreens‖ (cortinas de humo) were another common tactic of
Fujimori‘s government to maintain and increase civilian support of his
repressive rule.82 This involved feeding journalists trivial pieces of news that
would be strategically blown out of proportion to distract the population from
more pressing issues.83 In this way, Fujimori‘s government employed
techniques like ―political spin, sensation, and insider buzz‖ to shape the daily
news, thus denying citizens ―a solid basis for critical thinking or effective
action.‖84 One of the earliest and most representative examples of these
smokescreens was the ―Crying Virgin.‖85 In the district of Callao in 1991, a
statue of the Virgin Mary was said to be found crying real tears.86 With all of
Lima‘s attention on its neighboring miracle, the cholera epidemic that killed
many people in lower classes nearly went unnoticed.87
Meanwhile, Montesinos also controlled television programming by
offering large bribes to station owners. This strategy sought to promote
―‗political reeducation‘ or perverse, authoritative politicizing.‖88
For
example, Fujimori used a popular talk show hosted by Laura Bozzo to bolster
his regime.89 On the contrary, when station owner Baruch Ivcher Bronstein, a
dual citizen of Israeli birth, refused to capitulate to this pressure, Fujimori‘s
government stripped him of his Peruvian citizenship, forcing Ivcher to leave
the country.90 Through this type of extensive manipulation of television
79. See CARLOS IVÁN DEGREGORI, LA DÉCADA DE LA ANTIPOLÍTICA: AUGE Y HUÍDA DE
ALBERTO FUJIMORI Y VLADIMIRO MONTESINOS 173 (2000). Examples of chicha newspapers
include EL MAÑANERO, EL CHINO, LA CHUCHI, EL TÍO, and EL CHATO. McMillan & Zoido, supra
note 71, at 79.
80. DEGREGORI, supra note 79, at 114 n.2 (authors‘ trans.).
81. See BOWEN, supra note 62, at 342–43; DEGREGORI, supra note 79, at 114 n.2 (authors‘
trans.).
82. See Jo-Marie Burt, “Quien Habla Es Terroista”: The Political Use of Fear in Fujimori’s
Peru, 41 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 32, 53 (2006).
83. See id. (describing how counterinsurgency operations were used as a smokescreen to cover
up the Fujimori government‘s crimes).
84. See BENNETT, supra note 7, at xvi.
85. BOWEN, supra note 62, at 340.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. DEGREGORI, supra note 79, at 115 (authors‘ trans.).
89. Id. (authors‘ trans.).
90. Bronstein eventually resorted to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to seek
relief, resulting in a judgment by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Ivcher Bronstein v.
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programs and televised news, it became difficult to distinguish governmentfabricated news from real news. For example, in a trial against him in August
1996, well-known druglord Demetrio Chávez Peñaherrera, nicknamed
―Vaticano,‖ testified that Montesinos gave him $50,000 each month between
July 1991 and August 1992 to use an air landing strip in a drug-trafficking
zone of the Peruvian jungle.91 However, under suspicious circumstances,
Vaticano reappeared the following day, and—stuttering—retracted what he
had first testified, deactivating possible investigations of Montesinos.92 There
was later evidence that Vaticano had been tortured,93 as were many who
criticized the government, making it even more difficult to distinguish which
news could be trusted and which news was manipulated.
Over time, the field of information in Peru turned into a ―dumbing
propagandistic monologue manufactured by mercenaries of the pen, voice and
image, whose intention was to keep Peruvians in the idolatry of the regime.‖ 94
The media grew ―debased through bribes and through fear, instrumenting
campaigns to manipulate public opinion.‖95 Indeed, one of Fujimori‘s most
powerful media tricks was to sustain the perceived threat of terrorism to
maintain public support for his draconian and otherwise unlawful activity. He
employed a common technique among political actors to ―use . . . myths,
stereotypes, scapegoats, and other symbolic devices‖96 to influence the
public‘s perceptions. It has been observed that
[W]hen the media tell such stories because they fit the news
values that organizations are looking for, there are few
restraints on the fabrication of political reality. Under such
circumstances, political actors can manage issues, conflicts,
and crises by simply throwing symbols at them—symbols
that may be irrelevant to the matters at hand yet provoke
powerful emotional responses from the public.97

Peru, Case 11.762, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 20/98, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, doc. 6 rev. (1997),
available at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/97eng/Peru111762.htm. See also Case of IvcherBronstein v. Peru, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 54 (Sept. 24, 1999), available at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_54_ing.pdf.
91. BOWEN, supra note 62, at 268.
92. Regreso con Roncha, CARETAS (Peru), Apr. 10, 2003, available at
http://www.caretas.com.pe/2003/1767/articulos/roncha.phtml (authors‘ trans.).
93. Id.
94. Mario Vargas Llosa, Cómo Fujimori Jodió al Perú, in CÓMO FUJIMORI JODIÓ AL PERÚ,
supra note 73, at 15, 17 (authors‘ trans.).
95. Id. (authors‘ trans.).
96. Author W. Lance Bennett argues that there is always a temptation for politicians to use
―myths, stereotypes, scapegoats, and other symbolic devices.‖ BENNETT, supra note 7, at 105.
97. Id.
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Similarly, Fujimori fabricated his own news, reproduced by the majority of
media outlets, to shape popular opinion toward supporting his questionable
regime.
Ironically, despite all of these controls, it was the national media that
caused the demise of Fujimori‘s regime in 2000. A group of congressmen and
journalists from the opposition called a press conference to show one of
thousands of ―vladivideos‖98—the term for videos showing Montesinos
bribing hundreds of powerful elites, including members of the press, Peruvian
Congress, business community, entertainment industry, and other spheres of
influence.99 The video event, fully covered by the broadcast and print media,
unleashed an incredible scandal, serving as proof of what many had long
suspected and attempted to prove in vain: the extent to which Peru‘s
democracy and society had been corrupted. Fujimori staged a dramatic
manhunt of Montesinos, who had fled to Panama, and aired a broadcast that
featured him confiscating the remaining videos from Montesinos‘ home.100
Soon after, on November 13, 2000, Fujimori fled the country under the
pretext of attending an international conference, only to fax his resignation
from Japan where he would reside for the next five years.101 From there, he
ran a weekly radio program to maintain his political base, one that would
continue to support him even up until and after his criminal conviction in
2009.102
In the wake of Fujimori‘s departure, the transitional government
embarked on its transitional justice project by establishing the PTRC in 2001
to begin investigations into the internal armed conflict and Fujimori‘s
authoritarian regime.103 The PTRC‘s two-year investigation concluded with
the publication of its nine-volume Final Report, in which it detailed
systematic human rights violations since 1980.104 It estimated that 70,000
people had been killed, disproportionately impacting the poor, rural,
98. McMillan & Zoido, supra note 71, at 71, 89.
99. Id. at 71.
100. John R. Hamilton, The Fall of Fujimori: A Diplomat’s Perspective, 30 FLETCHER F.
WORLD AFF. 191, 200–04 (2006); Clifford Krauss, Playing Cat and Mouse, with Copters, in Peru,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2000, at A10.
101. Laplante, supra note 3, at 957; Hamilton, supra note 100, at 208.
102. Much evidence reveals that Alberto Fujimori has retained a certain level of support in
Peru. For instance, a February 2008 survey conducted while he was on trial for human rights
violations in Peru revealed that he was the politician with whom Peruvians most sympathized. See
Praxis Institute for Social Justice, Fujimori on Trial Blog, Fujimorismo: A Rising Power? (Apr. 16,
2008), http://fujimoriontrial.org/?p=287. Furthermore, Fujimori‘s political party was also leading the
polls for the 2011 presidential race with its candidate, Keiko Fujimori, the former president‘s
daughter. See Praxis Institute for Social Justice, Fujimori on Trial Blog, Conviction Doesn‘t Settle
Debate on Fujimori‘s Presidency (May 13, 2009), http://fujimoriontrial.org/?p=616.
103. See Laplante, supra note 3, at 919.
104. See generally PTRC, supra note 5.
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indigenous farmers.105 The PTRC recognized that its mission included
educating the country about the massive human rights violations that occurred
during Peru‘s ―war on terrorism.‖106 This task depended on media outreach,
an observation the PTRC learned by studying previous truth commissions
around the world.107
B. The Media and Truth Commissions
Transitional justice projects inevitably rely on the media to reach their
goals of disseminating the truth about a dark period of a country‘s history.
Certainly, given the central role that the media plays in keeping citizens
informed and shaping public opinion in democratic societies,108 it is inevitable
that the media would also influence the public‘s impression of the work of
transitional justice mechanisms and the information the transitional justice
mechanisms seek to impart. Indeed, news making is ―agenda setting‖ because
it influences what the ―public regards as important for them to think about in
society and politics.‖109
An example of the media‘s agenda-setting power can be seen in the way
Spain‘s local media renewed public interest in righting past abuses after a
twenty-year ―pact of forgetting.‖110 Dictator General Francisco Franco came
to power in Spain after a gruesome civil war from 1936 to 1939 between
Franco‘s Nationalist forces and the Spanish Republicans, resulting in more
than 300,000 deaths.111 Upon winning the war, Franco instated a repressive
dictatorship, which lasted until his death in 1975.112 During that time, an
estimated 440,000 Republicans went into exile, and another 400,000 remained
in Spain and were subjected to imprisonment or forced labor.113 The
Republicans were also systematically attacked by the regime through the
media and educational systems that ―portrayed the defeated Republicans as
bloodthirsty traitors against Spain.‖114 Yet, upon Franco‘s death, Spanish
society virtually buried his government‘s abuses against the ―defeated
enemy,‖ opting to forget the past rather than carry out truth commissions and

105. HATUN WILLAKUY, VERSIÓN ABREVIADA DEL INFORME FINAL DE LA COMISIÓN DE LA
VERDAD Y RECONCILIACIÓN 434 (2004).
106. Laplante, supra note 4, at 147–48.
107. See id. at 148.
108. BENNETT, supra note 7, at 2.
109. Id. at 8.
110. See Madeleine Davis, Is Spain Recovering Its Memory?: Breaking the Pacto del Olvido,
27 HUM. RTS. Q. 858, 873–74 (2005).
111. Id. at 860.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 862.
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trials to redress wrongdoings.115
However, local media coverage of the extradition proceedings brought
against Chile‘s former dictator Augusto Pinochet, who had traveled to
England in 1998 for medical treatment, reignited interest in seeking
accountability about the truth and human rights violations.116 Spanish Judge
Baltazar Garzón Real‘s petition to extradite Pinochet for alleged human rights
crimes against Spanish citizens roused the country‘s collective memory of its
own dictator.117 As the Spanish press began to draw parallels with Franco,
Spain began to reexamine its own conflict and post-conflict periods.118
Eventually, journalists and academics helped beckon in a delayed transitional
justice project through advocating the importance of ―reactivating
memory,‖119 which led to the exhumation of mass graves, the identification of
victims‘ remains, literature, and museum exhibits on the war.120 In essence,
the local media was able to awaken the society‘s quest for the truth, a need
that had gone largely underground.
Spain‘s experience speaks of the effort to construct collective narratives
and interpretations of the past. One of the key roles that the media plays in
transitional justice settings, as exemplified by Spain, is facilitating public
debate and deliberation on difficult truths about a collective past.121 Yet,
arriving at a collective memory of the past is one of the greatest challenges
facing a post-conflict society because it implies reaching a consensus in a
polarized context.122 While truth commissions attempt to present an objective
account of the events of a society‘s repressive or violent past, they inevitably
contend with multiple perspectives and interpretations of this history. In
essence, truth commissions must mediate this conflict to bring society to a
shared version of this past, which arguably entails a society-wide admission
that egregious human rights violations occurred and that victims must be
acknowledged. However, for this end to result, truth commissions rely on the
media to encourage consensus-making about the past—a daunting task.
A report on the media and conflict prevention issued by the United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
contends that the media have the opportunity to provide a safe battleground to
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

See id. at 862–66.
Id. at 868.
Id.
Id. at 868–69.
Id. at 873–74.
Id. at 874.
See, e.g., id.
See ALEXANDRA BARAHONA DE BRITO, CARMEN GONZALEZ ENRIQUEZ & PALOMA
AGUILAR, THE POLITICS OF MEMORY: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN DEMOCRATIZING SOCIETIES 1
(2001).
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―help[] . . . transform destructive conflicts into non-destructive debates.‖123 In
theory, the findings of truth commissions, if transmitted through newspapers,
television, and radio, can encourage dialogue while also raising recognition of
how citizens, and society in general, suffered as a consequence of the
breakdown of the rule of law and violations of human rights. Transitional
justice scholars argue that reconciliation can only follow once this collective
memory has been attained.124
The transitional justice experience in South Africa exemplifies the critical
role that the media can play in assuring that a truth commission‘s work enters
the public domain for full debate and discussion. South Africa undertook its
transitional justice process to address almost fifty years of apartheid
(1948–1994) by establishing its Truth and Reconciliation Commission
(SATRC) in 1995.125 The SATRC‘s public hearings, where victims publicly
gave testimony, enjoyed both extensive media coverage and ample public
interest.126 Truth Commission Deputy Chairman Alex Boraine wrote:
Unlike many other truth commissions, this one was center
stage, and the media coverage, particularly radio, enabled the
poor, the illiterate, and people living in rural areas to
participate in its work so that it was truly a national
experience rather than restricted to a small handful of selected
commissioners.127
Thus the media made the SATRC‘s work more accessible to diverse sectors of
society.
In contrast to South Africa‘s experience, the PTRC received limited media
attention and arguably failed to create a report accepted by all sides of the
conflict. To date, members of the armed forces and pro-Fujimori supporters
question the validity of the PTRC‘s findings, making ongoing challenges to
the methodology it employed to arrive at the victim count of nearly 70,000—a
statistical method brought to the PTRC by expert Patrick Ball and previously
used in the SATRC report.128 Attempts to initiate investigations into the
123. Andrew Puddephatt, Turning Broadcasters into a Genuine Public Service, in UNITED
NATIONS EDUC., SCI. AND CULTURAL ORG. (UNESCO), MEDIA: CONFLICT PREVENTION AND
RECONSTRUCTION 21, 22 (Barry James ed., 2004).
124. Laplante, supra note 13, at 445.
125. Catherine M. Cole, Performance, Transitional Justice, and the Law: South Africa’s Truth
and Reconciliation Commission, 59 THEATRE J. 167, 172 (2007).
126. Audrey R. Chapman & Patrick Ball, The Truth of Truth Commissions: Comparative
Lessons from Haiti, South Africa, and Guatemala, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 1, 23 (2001).
127. Cole, supra note 125, at 172 (quoting Alex Boraine, A COUNTRY UNMASKED: INSIDE
SOUTH AFRICA‘S TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION 89 (2000)).
128. See Jina Moore, A Human Rights Statistician Finds Truth in Numbers, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Feb. 7, 2008, at 20. Before this estimation, the country‘s NGOs and ombudsman had
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PTRC‘s use of funds continuously surface even today, enjoying wide press
coverage, yet never resulting in substantial discovery of embezzlement and all
the while implying the commissioners were corrupt.129
During the PTRC‘s work from 2001 to 2003, media reports tended to
focus on scandals and logistics, offering merely superficial information
without digging into the deeper issues. The beginning of the PTRC‘s
formation was marked by reports on budget and salary.130 Headlines on the
PTRC would read The Truth Commission Needs More than $5 Million for
Work131 or Commissioners Start Work with 260,000-Dollar Deficit.132 A
pro-Fujimori newspaper capitalized on the commissioners‘ salaries, disclosing
each one‘s pay as listed on supposedly ―secret documents‖ of the PTRC‘s
accounts that the newspaper‘s journalists had skillfully acquired.133 This in
turn provoked responses from the commissioners, reassuring that these
salaries were public information.134
Similarly, during the middle of its work in 2002, the PTRC received
strong criticism from the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana political
party (APRA),135 headed by Alan García, who had been president during one
of the periods (1985–1990) included in the PTRC work, and, at the time of
publication, was serving as its president. The APRA made public statements
claiming that it would request a new truth commission, one ―that is authentic
and impartially reviews cases of human rights violations in Peru without
political connotations.‖136
APRA politician Mauricio Mulder further
suggested that the commissioners resign.137 Incidentally, these remarks were
produced around the time that the PTRC was investigating Alan García
concerning his role during the violence.138 In response, a sort of ping-pong
debate sparked in the media, in which various public figures, including the
commissioners themselves, commented on the criticisms and spoke in favor
calculated that 25,000 people were killed.
129. See Comisión de Defensa cita a miembros de la CVR, PERÚ21, Oct. 2, 2008, at 8,
available at http://peru21.pe/noticia/217649/comision-defensa-cita-miembros-comision-verdad.
130. See, e.g., Comisionados inician labor con déficit de 260 mil dólares, LIBERACIÓN (Peru),
Sept. 18, 2001; Más de US$ 5 millones necesita Comisión de la Verdad para labor, CORREO (Peru),
Aug. 18, 2001.
131. Más de US$ 5 millones necesita Comisión de la Verdad para labor, supra note 130.
132. Comisionados inician labor con déficit de 260 mil dólares, supra note 130.
133. Comisionados de la Verdad cobran honorarios en dólares a través del PNUD, LA RAZÓN
(Peru), Apr. 5, 2002 (authors‘ trans.).
134. See No hay planillas secretas en Comisión de la Verdad, LA REPÚBLICA (Peru), Apr. 6,
2002.
135. APRA pedirá nueva Comisión de la Verdad, CORREO (Peru), Mar. 27, 2002, at 4.
136. Id. (authors‘ trans.).
137. Víctor Durand, Partidos respaldan Comisión de la Verdad, LA REPÚBLICA (Peru), Mar.
30, 2002, at 5.
138. Alan García no tiene miedo a ser investigado, EXPRESO (Peru), Mar. 28, 2002.

270

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[93:251

or against them.139 Needless to say, the public‘s attention was repeatedly
focused on these media-driven controversies instead of on the issues at
heart—the brutal killing of thousands of marginalized Peruvians as a result of
a questionable national security campaign.
Consequently, the PTRC report has yet to provide a common ground
between conflicting sectors of society, resulting in polarization on key issues
that continue to be the root cause of present-day conflicts. At bottom, there is
still a large majority of the population that believes the state violence was
justified to defeat terrorism, reflecting a common sentiment that all the
victims were terrorists140 (although the PTRC reported many massacres in
which children and elderly were killed; moreover, many victims were killed
outside of battle and without previous judicial determination of their
affiliations141). This attitude results in a continued high tolerance for state
abuse and the failure to demand accountability. Francisco Miró Quesada,
director of local news group El Comercio, described Peru‘s penchant for
authoritarianism in the following way: ―[D]ictatorship is a bad inheritance
from traditional societies . . . . Conflict is in the head of those who only
understand democracy as a formal rather than real mechanism. This happens
because in the Peruvian state and in Peruvian society there exists in many
sectors an authoritarian culture.‖142
In fact, some academics have already noted this tendency in post-conflict
settings and have suggested that theories of political transition have been
limited by focusing only on ―particular conceptions of democracy.‖143 Not all
governments tainted by human rights abuses may be so clearly labeled
―authoritarian.‖ Rather, similar violations may be ―manifest in states that
have experienced prolonged, structured, communal, political violence, even
where the political structures could broadly be considered ‗democratic.‘‖144
This observation is particularly clear in the case of Peru. While certain
sectors of Peruvian society are certain that Fujimori was a dictator, other
sectors pardon his hardhandedness because they believe him responsible for
139. For one example, see Carlos Tapia dice que Mulder está mal informado, LIBERACIÓN
(Peru), Mar. 24, 2002.
140. See Lisa J. Laplante & Kimberly Theidon, Commissioning Truth, Constructing Silences:
The Peruvian Truth Commission and the Other Truths of “Terrorists,” in MIRRORS OF JUSTICE:
LAW AND POWER IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA (Kamari Maxine Clarke & Mark Goodale eds.,
forthcoming 2010).
141. See 6 PTRC, supra note 5, at ch.1.
142. Posting of Francisco Miró Quesada R. to Audiencias Públicas de El Comercio,
http://blogs.elcomercio.pe/audiencias/2009/06/consulta-dialogo-y-modernidad.html (June 26, 2009)
(authors‘ trans.).
143. Fionnuala Ní Aoláin & Colm Campbell, The Paradox of Transition in Conflicted
Democracies, 27 HUM. RTS. Q. 172, 173 (2005).
144. Id. at 174.
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eradicating terrorism.145 As a result, Peru remains polarized not only on the
issue of Fujimori, but on whether a hardhanded ruler is actually more
effective than a democratic leader. The failure to create a collective memory
and consensus on what minimum human rights standards should apply when a
government uses its coercive force against a civilian population arguably
could be why social unrest in Peru still devolves into violent clashes with state
security.
In June 2009, indigenous communities in Bagua suffered a violent
encounter with police forces, culminating in the death of nine civilians and
twenty-four police officers, according to authorities, though native
communities have claimed the civilian toll reached at least twenty-five.146
After months of attempts at dialogue with the central government, indigenous
rights group National Organization of the Amazon Indigenous People of Peru
(AIDESEP) blocked a highway in the selva (jungle) as a sign of protest
against legislative decrees it believed jeopardized indigenous rights to land
and cultural identity.147 When the police acted on orders to clear the highway,
freeing transit, violence broke out, ultimately provoking the deaths.148
Commentators, including journalists, revisited the issue only recently raised
by the PTRC: the lack of a common belief in the rights of all citizens before
the state—even the historically marginalized and disenfranchised. Journalist
Guisella Vargas Ochoa wrote, ―the government needs to use more wisely
tools that allow us to communicate in order to prevent or resolve the current
crisis and to bring about unity among Peruvians, recognizing the importance
of citizen participation in decision-making.‖149 Yet this communication
failure was arguably exacerbated by the media‘s role in reporting on the
growing tensions in Bagua, and undermined the space for dialogue. Political
analyst Mirko Lauer described the media scene in his local column:
The Bagua tragedy instantly converted in[to] a war of
different perspectives launched with fury and defiance, which
the media has taken on with a similar attitude. The
government talks of an international conspiracy while the
opposition makes accusations of planned genocide. Up to
145. Kelly Phenicie & Lisa Laplante, Peru: The Struggle for Memory, OPENDEMOCRACY, Apr.
8, 2009, http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/peru-the-struggle-for-memory.
146. Simon Romero, Protestors Gird for Long Fight over Opening Peru’s Amazon, N.Y.
TIMES, June 12, 2009, at A6.
147. Id.
148. Qué ministros dejaron el Gabinete Ministerial junto a Yehude Simon?, EL COMERCIO
(Peru), June 11, 2009, http://www.elcomercio.com.pe/noticia/312801/que-ministros-dejarongabinete-ministerial-junto-yehude-simon (authors‘ trans.).
149. Guisella Vargas Ochoa, Como los siete palos, EL COMERCIO (Peru), July 9, 2009,
http://www.elcomercio.pe/impresa/notas/como-siete-palos/20090709/311671 (authors‘ trans.).
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now, there is no really effective evidence for either of these,
but they are still being repeated.150
In fact, the international press started to shine light on the reality behind
the events in Bagua.151 Foreign Affairs Minister José Antonio García
Belaunde stated that the foreign press, such as the newspapers New York
Times, Washington Post, and El Pais in Spain, began to dismiss false
allegations that Bagua was part of a genocide conspiracy.152
Thus, it could be argued that the failure of Peruvian society to reach a
consensus regarding the role that the government and armed forces should
assume during social conflict gives rise to continued conflicts. Arguably, the
PTRC‘s inability to really engage the media during its work—and the media‘s
corresponding inability to capitalize on underlying rather than superficial
issues—represents a failed opportunity. Had there been more societal
discussion about the tension between the State‘s national security issues and
citizens‘ rights, then perhaps this could have led to greater understanding
during future clashes between the state and the governed. Because the media
provide channels for carrying out debate on conflicting issues in polarized
societies, the media have the power to mediate these difficult conflicts.
Essentially, the critical role of the media here arises out of the fact that ―[i]n
modern societies . . . public deliberation is (and probably must be) largely
mediated, with professional communicators rather than ordinary citizens
talking to each other and to the public through mass media of
communications.‖153
The burden of this obligation suggests that journalists are responsible for
not only reporting information, but also processing it, as opposed to leaving it
in crude form—they do not necessarily have free reign to say and report
anything they want. For example, how a story is ―framed‖ will largely
determine its impact on the reader or viewer because it is ―the process by
which a communication source, such as a news organization, defines and
constructs a political issue or public controversy.‖154 Here, media reporting
does not consist of merely presenting the facts, but instead shaping the
150. Mirko Lauer, Bagua: no se puede manejar el tema con vaguedades, LA REPÚBLICA
(Peru), June 9, 2009, http://www.larepublica.pe/observador/09/06/2009/bagua-no-se-puede-manejarel-tema-con-vaguedades (authors‘ trans.).
151. Canciller: La verdad sobre Bagua se abre paso en medios extranjeros, RPP NOTICIAS
(Peru), June 17, 2009, http://www.rpp.com.pe/2009-06-17-canciller-la-verdad-sobre-bagua-se-abrepaso-en-medios-extranjeros-noticia_188764.html (authors‘ trans.).
152. Id.
153. BENJAMIN I. PAGE, WHO DELIBERATES?: MASS MEDIA IN MODERN DEMOCRACY 1
(1996).
154. Thomas E. Nelson, Rosalee A. Clawson & Zoe M. Oxley, Media Framing of a Civil
Liberties Conflict and Its Effect on Tolerance, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 567, 567 (1997).
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parameters for interpreting the facts and events published for mass
consumption. The media must understand that ―[p]eople‘s reasoning about
divisive political issues may be shaped by the mass media‘s depiction of the
issues.‖155
The importance of this process cannot be underestimated because it ―is
essential to democracy, in order to ensure that the public‘s policy
preferences—upon which democratic decisions are based—are informed,
enlightened, and authentic.‖156 Seeing as the media has the power to shape
public opinion, the media can serve to mitigate or provoke the extremes in
polarized societies, and thus the reaction to transitional mechanisms such as
truth commissions, trials, and reforms.
For example, the media can just as easily ―demonise people and contribute
to violence‖ as it can ―humanise opponents after a conflict.‖157 Whether
intentionally or not, the way journalists frame the information they receive
from news sources can drastically shape collective sentiments in tense
environments, either easing longstanding strife or exacerbating it:
[T]he choices journalists make about how to cover a story—
from the words, phrases, and images they convey to the
broader ―angle‖ they take on a controversy—can result in
substantially different portrayals of the very same event and
the broader controversy it represents. These alternative
portrayals, or frames, can exert appreciable influence on
citizens‘ perceptions of the issue and, ultimately, the opinions
they express.158
Ultimately the media can bridge the gap between ―others,‖ and overcome
the ―us versus them‖ phenomena by ―graphically illustrat[ing] how much
people have in common.‖159 In the case of Peru, much of the population still
views the thousands of slain and disappeared victims—largely indigenous
farmers—as terrorists deserving their punishment.160 By attempting to
―humanize‖ this population, the media could assist in breaking down
stereotypes and cultivating empathy and respect towards this underclass.
The failure of the PTRC to engage the media more fully in a way that
would offer new frames for understanding the conflict through a human rights
lens amounts to a missed opportunity. Greater discussion on this topic could
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id.
PAGE, supra note 153, at 1.
Puddephatt, supra note 123, at 22.
Nelson, Clawson & Oxley, supra note 154, at 576.
Puddephatt, supra note 123, at 22.
Laplante & Theidon, supra note 140.
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have helped strengthen a human rights culture and acted as a prophylactic
against future abuses. That is, when members of a society internalize the
mores of individual rights and state accountability, then they are more likely
to reject state political violence, while also demanding accountability
measures. Unfortunately, Peru‘s scant respect for the rule of law to date has
made its society less amenable to domestic human rights trials, including that
of Fujimori.
C. The Media and Trials
The state initiated criminal proceedings against Fujimori on December 10,
2007, after successfully winning its extradition request to Chile.161 Unlike
with the work of the PTRC, this human rights trial attracted impressive media
coverage that, in turn, generated elevated public interest. Being one of the
first presidents to stand trial in his home country, both national and
international press closely followed the Fujimori trial proceedings.162
Nationally, several major daily newspapers published either articles or small
updates for each trial session—nearly every Monday, Wednesday, and Friday
from December 10, 2007, until April 7, 2009. Similarly, televised news
programs gave periodic updates, and one cable news channel even aired all
161 trial sessions.163 When key witnesses testified, public television channels
also broadcasted these hearings, and news analyses programs conducted
related interviews with local experts on the proceedings. Frequently,
newspapers dedicated their front-page stories to Fujimori‘s criminal trial.
Yet, a national survey conducted by local pollster Ipsos APOYO revealed
that only 32% of the population believed the coverage was sufficient and 40%
thought the coverage was insufficient.164 Most notable was that the
state-owned channel failed to adequately cover the trial sessions, much less
broadcast them live.165 Only a cable television channel, available to
subscribers, aired all of the trial sessions,166 thus reaching a limited number of
Peruvians around the country.
161. Laplante, supra note 3, at 979.
162. Internationally, major news agencies such as the Associated Press and Reuters published
news only for significant events, such as the trial‘s start and end, medical problems that Fujimori
experienced, and testimony of key witnesses. See, e.g., Simon Romero, Peru’s Ex-President Is
Convicted and Given 25 Years for Killings and Other Abuses, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2009, at A6; see
also Peru: Fujimori Asleep at Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2008, at A12.
163. Praxis Institute for Social Justice, Fujimori on Trial Blog, State-Run Channel Doesn‘t Air
Fujimori‘s Trial (Apr. 11, 2008), http://fujimoriontrial.org/?p=277.
164. Ipsos APOYO, El avance de Keiko Fujimori (Mar. 16, 2009), http://www.ipsosapoyo.com.pe/sites/default/files/opinion_data/Opinion_Data_Marzo_2009.pdf [hereinafter Ipsos
APOYO]. Twenty percent of Peruvians considered the media coverage to be excessive. Id.
165. Praxis Institute for Social Justice, supra note 163.
166. Id.
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Significantly, the pro-Fujimori following—namely Fujimori‘s children
and members of his political party, including incumbent members of
Congress—repeatedly accused the local media of failing to publish objective
reports.167 During the trial, Fujimori‘s lawyer, César Nakazaki, even claimed
that the former president was the target of and long ago convicted in a ―media
trial‖ that was, in turn, influencing the judges trying him. 168 In contrast, an
opinion poll showed that 41% of Peruvians believed the trial media coverage
to be impartial and 13% considered it biased in Fujimori‘s favor.169 Yet,
accusations by Fujimori‘s supporters (referred to as ―Fujimoristas‖)
undoubtedly influenced the 33% who agreed that the coverage was biased
against Fujimori.170
This debate on media objectivity in Fujimori‘s trial resonates with an
ongoing tension in post-conflict media reporting on the standard for
objectivity. Ultimately, while Fujimori indeed had a right to a fair trial that
included a public hearing with impartial judges, if the media was reporting on
the evidence brought against him, then it was inevitable that they could appear
biased. The evidence was damning. Indeed, even before the PTRC wrote its
report condemning Fujimori‘s role in perpetrating human rights abuses,
national and international organizations issued scathing condemnations.171
Following Fujimori‘s self-coup, the international community openly called
into question his respect for democracy.172 Since then, major press agencies
have called his presidency ―authoritarian‖ and suggested he had
―near-dictatorial‖ tendencies.173 Furthermore, the Inter-American Court of
Human rights has implicated Fujimori‘s complicity in the same human rights
violations that formed the charges against him in his trial—the Barrios Altos
and La Cantuta massacres.174
167. See Mayoría de medios ya condenó a mi padre, RPP NOTICIAS, Feb. 23, 2009,
http://www.rpp.com.pe/2009-02-23-mayoria-de-medios-ya-condeno-a-mi-padre-afirma-keikofujimori-noticia_166213.html.
168. Praxis Institute for Social Justice, Fujimori on Trial Blog, Fujimori‘s Defense Says
Certain Judicial Powers Are Weak when Faced with Media Pressure (Feb. 20, 2009),
http://fujimoriontrial.org/?p=576.
169. Ipsos APOYO, supra note 164.
170. See id.
171. See ROBIN KIRK & ANNE MANUAL, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS IN PERU:
ONE YEAR AFTER FUJIMORI‘S COUP (1993).
172. See Barbara Crossette, U.S., Condemning Fujimori, Cuts Aid to Peru, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7,
1992, at A16.
173. Calvin Sims, Key Officials Quit in Peru as Fujimori Faces Protests, N.Y. TIMES, July 18,
1997, at A3; Nathaniel C. Nash, Fujimori Winning Both Peruvian Votes, Counts Show, N. Y. TIMES,
Nov. 23, 1992, at A3.
174. Barrios Altos Case, 2002 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75 (Mar. 14, 2001), available at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_75_ing.pdf; La Cantuta Case, 2007 Inter-Am.
Ct.
H.R.
(ser.
C)
No.
162
(Nov.
29,
2006),
available
at
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D. Mitigating Sensationalization
At the same time Fujimori supporters were saying that the media was
biased against him, they were using the media to create their own distractions
to the real issues at trial.175 In this way, they demonstrated one of the greatest
challenges for the media in post-conflict settings with regard to
sensationalization. As seen in various transitional societies, some individuals
belonging to one side of a past conflict either strategically or inadvertently
dramatize conflict-related issues.
This situation can present serious
difficulties for journalists who strive to adhere to the classic professional
standard ―as defined by fairness, accuracy, balance, and detached, fact-based
reporting.‖176 By not mediating the unrefined facts in an effort to stay neutral
and fair, journalists show how ―the very reporting norms that seem most
desirable actually limit [their] capacity . . . to challenge deceptions and lies
when they occur.‖177
For example, in 2002, Slobodan Milosevic, ex-president of the former
Yugoslavia, was placed on trial in The Hague for alleged war crimes and
crimes against humanity,178 including ethnic cleansing for killing
approximately 250,000 Kosovar Albanians. Yet despite such grave charges,
he was able to captivate Serbian society with accusations that his trial
signified a political prosecution.179 Milosevic was able to ―transform his
identity as the accused and a prisoner into that of a hero.‖180 One Serb
recounted that his mother had ―hated Milosevic more than anyone else‖ but
then converted as she watched his trial, ―encourag[ing] him with ‗bravo‘
shouts, although she hated him for ten years.‖181 It was through the
transparency of his trial‘s media coverage that Milosevic managed to
reanimate past conspiracy theories and present himself as a hero.182 The fact
that the media allowed Milosevic to broadcast his allegations, in the end,
strengthened the support of his followers and kept alive societal divisions in
Serbia, as seen when tens of thousands of supporters attended Milosevic‘s

http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_162_ing.pdf.
175. See, e.g., Praxis Institute for Social Justice, supra note 168.
176. BENNETT, supra note 7, at xxiii–xxiv.
177. Id. at xxiv.
178. Marlise Simons, Milosevic Died of Heart Attack, Autopsy Shows, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13,
2006, at A1.
179. Jelena Tosic, Transparent Broadcast?: The Reception of Milošević’s Trial in Serbia, in
PATHS TO INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE: SOCIAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 83, 90, 94 (Marie-Bénédicte
Dembour & Tobias Kelly eds., 2007).
180. Id. at 94.
181. Id. at 93.
182. Id. at 90, 94.
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funeral after he died on March 18, 2006, while imprisoned at The Hague.183
Arguably, the media‘s failure to screen some of Milosevic statements, no
doubt because they were merely reporting ―the facts,‖ potentially delayed
societal reconciliation.
Similar to Milosevic, Fujimori also increased his own popularity through
a calculated use of the media coverage of his trial. For example, on the first
day of his human rights trial, the judges asked if he accepted the charges
brought against him. Fujimori gave a four-minute speech on how he had
saved the country from terrorism, culminating in his energetic plea: ―I am
innocent!‖184 This exclamation yielded ample coverage nationally and
internationally and resulted in the creation of cell phone ringtones and music
videos using Fujimori‘s proclamation as a theme song. 185 Fujimori not only
played on the resilient belief of a large portion of the population that his
hardhanded approach to the war on terrorism saved the country, he also
solidified this collective interpretation of the past. Importantly, he achieved
this influence only because the media did not provide a larger context to
contest his claims. One rarely sees reference to an important historical fact
clarified by the PTRC: years of intelligence investigations initiated before
Fujimori came to power ultimately led to the arrest of terrorist group leaders,
and consequently the decline in violence.186 Thus, the media failed to raise
awareness that Fujimori‘s hardhanded measures occurred after the terrorist
threat to the nation had largely ended.
At the same time, Fujimori and the Fujimoristas used the press during his
human rights trial to distract the public with trivial matters, and thus drew
attention away from evidence that might dissuade them from supporting
Fujimori. For example, Fujimori and his family frequently complained to the
local media that abusive prison conditions were responsible for his
deteriorating health.187 When Fujimori was diagnosed with a small outbreak
of leukoplakia, a type of lesion characterized by white patches, a pro-Fujimori
newspaper ran the headline Fujimori Has Cancer! Abusive Trial Kills Him
Slowly on its front page.188 Yet, Fujimori was never diagnosed with cancer,
and the press failed to inform the public that leukoplakia only causes cancer in

183. Milosevic Buried in Hometown, Voice of Am. News (Mar. 18, 2006),
http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2006-03-18-voa5.html.
184. Monte Hayes, Former Peru President Sentenced to 6 Years in Prison for Abuse of
Authority, Associated Press (Dec. 12, 2007).
185. See
YouTube.com,
Ringtone
Fujimori
..
Soy
inocente!!!,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YsRqsJJWYnI&feature=related (last visited Dec. 2, 2009).
186. 8 PTRC, supra note 5, at 156.
187. Praxis Institute for Social Justice, Fujimori on Trial Blog, Fujimori: Victim of His Own
Health? (May 23, 2008), http://fujimoriontrial.org/?p=335.
188. Fujimori tiene cáncer!, LA RAZÓN (Peru), May 20, 2008, at 1 (authors‘ trans.).
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an estimated three percent of those who experience lesions.189 Fujimori‘s son,
Kenji Fujimori, also told members of the press that his father suffered from
―high arterial hypertension, bronchitis, acute lumbago [lower back pain],
swelling in the legs, digestive disorders and new worrying symptoms,‖
supposedly as a result of his prison conditions.190 Yet in reality, the former
president had daily access to an outdoor patio, could receive visits from
anyone he approved, had an ample living area, television, and all the reading
material he requested.191 These kinds of public relations maneuvers amount to
―careful stage setting, scripting, and acting to create convincing images that
often have little to do with the underlying reality of the situation,‖ essentially
―pseudo event[s]‖ that create false truths.192
On one occasion, Peru‘s then-Justice Minister Rosario Fernández was
moved to publicly scold Fujimori‘s political supporters for their misleading
statements to the press. She ordered them to be ―more responsible in their
declarations [to the press], because they are misinforming the population
regarding former president Alberto Fujimori‘s legal and personal situation.‖193
Yet, perhaps the responsibility for this misinformation belongs, in part, to
journalists for failing to either filter any outrageous statements or to provide
alternative views to counter them and provide the public with a more balanced
view of the truth. By merely ―reporting‖ what the Fujimoristas said, local
journalists exacerbated the drama, and, consequently, the division among
Peruvians. Here they once again revealed a paradox of journalism by which
―the more objective or fair reporters try to be, the more official bias they
introduce into the news.‖194 By not screening out such sensationalization,
journalists become complicit in distracting audiences from the real issues at
hand. They fall prey to this ploy to ―trivialize news content‖ to ―distract[]
attention from any broad or enduring political significance the event may have
had.‖195 If the information is ―inaccurate, incomplete, misleading, or full of
outright lies . . . even a rational public can be fooled.‖196 Unfortunately, the
consequences are not just a harmful nuisance because such information can
189. Praxis Institute for Social Justice, Fujimori on Trial Blog, Specialist Explains Leukoplakia
and its Effects (May 26, 2008), http://fujimoriontrial.org/?p=340.
190. Kenji Fujimori: “Se han enseñado con mi padre,” 24 HORAS LIBRE (Peru), May 19, 2008,
http://www.24horaslibre.com/politica/1211203545.php (authors‘ trans.).
191. Ex dictador tenía privilegios carcelarios antes de la renovación de su régimen,
LA
REPÚBLICA
(Peru),
Aug.
4,
2008,
http://www.larepublica.pe/archive/all/larepublica/20080804/pasadas/15/161478.
192. BENNETT, supra note 7, at 132.
193. Fujimoristas deben dejar de desinformar, LA REPÚBLICA (Peru), Feb. 24, 2008,
http://www.larepublica.pe/archive/all/larepublica/20080224/1/node/26038/total/01 (authors‘ trans.).
194. BENNETT, supra note 7, at 157.
195. Id. at 57.
196. PAGE, supra note 153, at 2.
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mislead the public towards ―favoring policies that harm themselves and their
neighbors, or policies that violate their deepest values.‖197
In the end, the failure of the Peruvian journalists to mediate the
Fujimoristas‘ sensationalism has meant that the journalists failed to address
the ongoing public opinion that the alleged crimes were justified. In October
2007, a poll revealed that 78% of residents in Peru‘s capital city Lima
approved of the former president‘s extradition home to face criminal charges
of corruption and human rights violations.198 But in June 2008—six months
after Fujimori‘s human rights trial began—another survey showed that while
53% of Peruvians believed Fujimori was guilty of the charges he faced,
almost 65% said they still approved of his government because they believed
he was responsible for eradicating terrorism and ending the internal
conflict.199 In this way, the trial coverage did not contest the idea that human
rights violations are justified in national security situations. On the contrary,
the trial coverage has helped to increase Fujimori‘s image as the country‘s
savior, and thus increased his popularity. In fact, the sudden political
prominence of his daughter Keiko Fujimori, who has been a member of
Congress since 2006 and during the trial ascended the polls as the favorite
potential 2011 presidential election candidate,200 may be directly linked to the
Fujimoristas‘ manipulation of the media.
IV. BUILDING AN APPROACH TO THE MEDIA IN
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE PROCESSES
The media plays a central role in reconciliation processes that assure
conflict resolution and prevention. Yet, a transition process does not begin
with a whole new media system, but rather inherits whatever media
institutions existed before and inevitably played a role during the period in
question. Thus, countries embarking on a transitional justice project must
also inevitably consider how to address any long-term damage to national
media institutions and cultures. As one scholar observed:
In post-conflict contexts where the society was torn asunder
through words as well as other weapons, almost all stations
are often affiliated with a highly partisan political party or a
197. Id.
198. Ultimo Estudio de Opinión Pública Política a Nivel Lima Metropolitana—29 Septiembre
al
02
de
Octubre
2007
I
Parte,
CPI
(Oct.
2,
2007),
http://www.cpi.com.pe/descarges/OPLI20071002.pdf.
199. Julio Salazar Monroe dice que altos cargos militares dependían de Fujimori, EL
COMERCIO (Peru), June 3, 2008, http://www.elcomercio.com.pe/ediciononline/HTML/2008-0602/julio-salazar-monroe-dice-que-altos-cargos-militares-dependian-fujimori.html.
200. See Praxis Institute for Social Justice, supra note 102.
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local power. Patterns of professional journalistic ethics and
responsibility are often in decline and, as a result, the level of
professionalism of local media outlets is often relatively low
when measured against international standards. This lack of
professionalism further undermines any claim of
independence that these local media outlets claim.201
Certainly, journalists also are products of the conflict that a country has
experienced. The fact that journalists are often persecuted, threatened, or
harmed during conflicts may very well affect their ability to have a neutral
opinion, report objectively on their oppressors, or mitigate sensationalism
from certain sectors.202 The process of transitional justice, including a truth
commission and subsequent trials, may even represent a kind of ―victory‖ for
them. In this way, journalists may see this process as vindication of their
views such that they become unwilling to offer other, opposing views.203
This particular challenge was reported during Liberia‘s transitional justice
period. Despite the significant investment of resources in training journalists,
it was still ―hard to tell when a story‖ on the Liberian truth commission or the
Charles Taylor trial was ―news or opinion.‖204 Similarly, in Cambodia, the
United Nations Transitional Authority for Cambodia (UNTAC) confronted
many difficulties when it attempted to rebuild the media institution after the
Khmer Rouge regime collapsed in 1998.205 In particular, it was hard to undo
the professional culture after years of state-controlled media that since 1975
had instilled a habit of obedience, prohibited an independent journalist
association, killed journalists, and generally discouraged a free press guided
by codes of professional ethics.206 With minimal effective redress for libel
and other civil offenses, local journalists lacked professional restraint and
newspapers subsidized by powerful individuals would run ―wild headlines
and unsourced stories—especially in the years of the coalition government
from 1993 to 1997—[that] contributed to the political tension and
fractionalisation.‖207

201. Price, supra note 25, at 3.
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This situation raises the challenging question of whether certain protocols
or guidelines should be established for the media operating in post-conflict
settings. As one advocate of this approach explains, ―[t]here must be a more
systematic international approach to building or rebuilding the media
environment in post-conflict societies. It is no use promising vast sums of
money for reconstruction and then moving on to . . . a different conflict zone
six months later. Building institutions is a long term commitment . . . .‖208
The Institute on War and Peace Reporting has a set of ―six duties‖ for
journalists covering conflict and peace.209 The list outlines that reporters,
even in the face of the increased external pressures that come with war, must
maintain standards such as professional research and balanced coverage.210
But it goes further, highlighting the responsibility of reporters to cover the
―trauma and the human stories of all the conflict‘s victims,‖ and that true
balance requires a look at alternatives to war: ―We should report on the efforts
of those working on peace and reconciliation every bit as much as those who
exacerbate the conflict.‖211 The list of duties ends with a call for journalists to
consider the impact of their work and the necessity to remain independent
observers: ―We should always be aware that our reporting will affect the
conflict and the lives of people in it. We should be ever vigilant to avoid
being used by one side or the other in their war efforts and to expose those
attempts at media manipulation if so found.‖212
Although related to war journalism, the same idea could apply to
post-conflict settings. In fact, a whole new genre of peace journalism or
―conflict sensitive journalism‖213 has been developed ―to positively influence
behavioral responses to conflict and shepherd in a new era of understanding,
harmony, and security in conflict regions and broken societies across the
world‖ and to foster tolerance and reconciliation.214 Communication scholar
Bennett introduces the idea that journalists owe democracy a duty of social
responsibility, guided by certain ―professional norms‖ that he defines as
―those moral standards, codes of ethics, and guidelines about inserting one‘s
voice and viewpoint into a story that enable journalists to make personal
208. Puddephatt, supra note 123, at 26.
209. The six duties are the duty to: (1) understand the conflict; (2) report fairly; (3) report the
background and causes of the conflict; (4) present the human side; (5) report on peace efforts; and (6)
recognize journalists‘ influence. INT‘L JOURNALISTS‘ NETWORK, GUIDELINES FOR PEACE
REPORTING, http://ijnet.org/ijnet/training_materials/guidelines_for_peace_reporting.
210. See id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Ross Howard, Global Journalism Ethics: Conflict Sensitive Journalism in Practice,
http://www.journalismethics.ca/global_journalism_ethics/conflict_sensitivity_in_practice.htm (last
visited Dec. 2, 2009).
214. Yamshon & Yamshon, supra note 24, at 422.
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decisions.‖215 Along these lines, in Bosnia the Office of the High
Representative established
an entire framework—an architecture of media law—with
objective standards and a mechanism to determine whether a
media violation occurred and the proper sanction for each
violation. The reform sought to put into place a new legal
system with tribunals, enforcement mechanisms, and
licensing agencies with the result that the media system
would no longer be ―ethnically based and directly or
indirectly associated to the main mono-ethnic political
parties.‖216
Yet, the attempt to create such standards raises the question: ―[H]ow can
the processes of media restructuring and support take place in a way most
consistent with international norms of freedom to receive and impart
information?‖217 Indeed, the right to information that lays the foundation for
freedom of the press arises out of international human rights law.218 The
United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) Media
Regulatory Commission provoked international controversy because its ―plan
to regulate the Kosovar press‖ appeared ―tantamount to censorship.‖219 Yet,
the fact that journalists have been convicted of war crimes and crimes against
humanity for their role in provoking political violence and assisting in
repressive regimes220 raises the question of whether there should be stricter
standards for the media. Thus, a balance must be struck.
In attempting to develop more systematic approaches to media reform,
there may very well be more than one approach to prescribing media policies
in post-conflict environments because the ―[s]pecific historic distinctions and
peacekeeping needs will be of paramount importance indicating priorities.‖221
Certainly,
the previous regime type has a determinative influence both
on the paths open for a transition country and on the tasks
215. BENNETT, supra note 7, at 156.
216. Price, supra note 25, at 12.
217. Id. at 3–4.
218. Stephanie Farrior, Hate Propaganda and International Human Rights Law, in FORGING
PEACE, supra note 28, at 69, 69.
219. Price, supra note 25, at 32.
220. See, e.g., Eric Blinderman, International Law and Information Intervention, in FORGING
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that need to be addressed in order to reach democratic
consolidation. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the
tasks and paths open for the establishment of free and
independent media could also be highly dependent upon the
previous regime of a country in transition.222
The landscape of preexisting media structures and those to come will
hopefully inform what approach must be taken to post-conflict recovery
schemes.
Based on the overwhelming evidence of the media‘s unavoidable impact
in conflict and post-conflict settings, we are convinced that the media can be
turned into a real agent in bringing about sustainable peace. However, for the
media to really attain this potential, more specialized studies must be
conducted to determine how to best implement in practice this theoretical
approach. To date, reports on support given to media reform still find that
studies on media impact have been more focused on freedom and pluralism
than on accountability, which has ―more or less been on the backburner.‖223
But the slant of a journalist, even if unintentional, can be just as damaging as
a dictator‘s fabrication; both can serve to mislead and ultimately form public
opinion based on misinformation. Here, that idea that the pen may be
mightier than the sword fits quite literally into the context of journalism and
war and post-conflict situations. For that reason, we call on journalists and
academics alike to further explore the particularities of the media‘s influence
on conflict issues and its untapped potential to mend societal ruptures.
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